1. Having read the comprehensive judgment of Fennelly J. on both the appeal and cross-appeal herein, I find myself in complete agreement with him in relation to both. I would, however, like to add a few observations of my own in relation to the appeal. There is nothing which I can usefully add in relation to the cross-appeal.

2. As Fennelly J. pointed out, the President of the High Court identified the issues affecting the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the section 14 warrants as being twofold i.e.

“Had (Judge Anderson) jurisdiction to issue the warrants:

(a) the District judge being assigned to more than one district, or

(b) the District judge issuing the search warrants, while not physically present within the relevant district (except in the case of the warrant issued in the Dublin Metropolitan District).”

4. Given that the multiple assignment in this case cannot be impugned the real issue is the second one i.e. whether Judge Anderson would have had to sit in each particular district in order to make the order. I am in complete agreement with Fennelly J. that on any reasonable interpretation of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 and later relevant Acts dealing with the existing or former District Court e.g. the Courts of Justice Act, 1953 or the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961, the District Court is intended to be a local court and, therefore, there is always a limited territorial jurisdiction in relation to any orders that can be made by that court. This is so notwithstanding that for the first time under the 1924 Act, the jurisdictions formerly vested in Magistrates and Justices of the Peace became vested not in persons as theretofore but in a new court “the District Court of Justice” . Even under the Provisions of the District Justices (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 the District Justices appointed thereunder were for all practical purposes Resident Magistrates under another name and, indeed, they are described in the Act as “Magistrates”. In a theoretical sense that all changed in 1924 and these jurisdictions became vested in one District Court which indeed was given new jurisdiction. S. 79 however of the 1924 Act clearly provided that in the three named categories of cases i.e. “civil cases”, “criminal cases” and “licencing cases” the jurisdiction vested in the District Court had to be exercised in particular districts connected with the particular litigation.

5. The statutory power to issue the warrants the subject matter of this case arises under brand new legislation and no such warrant was known to the courts as of 1924. I agree with Fennelly J. that because of the overall statutory provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court and how it is to be exercised, these warrants notwithstanding the silence of the statutory provision creating them must be issued within the districts wherein the premises are situate but I would not be certain that in this connection s. 78 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 has no relevance. The jurisdiction for instance to issue warrants under the Larceny Act to search a premises would have been transferred to the new District Court by that section. That section applied the provisions of s. 22 of the Act relating to the High Court and Supreme Court mutatis mutandis. That section in turn provided that where no provision is contained in any rules of court as long as there should be no rule with reference to the particular matter, jurisdiction should be exercised as nearly as possible in the same manner in which it might have been exercised by the courts from which the jurisdiction had been transferred. I think that a strong argument can be made that on this basis s. 78 can be invoked in relation to any provisions regarding search warrants even if they post-date the 1924 Act.

6. In numerous branches of District Court law (to use a shorthand expression) it is necessary to go back to the powers of Justices of the Peace etc. Over a period of eighty years a book like O’Connor has been found to be extremely useful to practitioners and District Court judges. It is true, of course, that normally this would arise in the context of jurisdictions which at least in some broad sense had existed prior to the 1924 Act. But given the terms of s. 22 as applied by s. 78, I am not convinced that s. 78 would not also be relevant in considering the issue of where orders should be made for the issue of section 14 search warrants.

7. As far as the judgment of the President of the High Court is concerned, the applicability of pre-1924 law arose in a somewhat different context in that he took the view that it was relevant to consider whether the issue of the search warrant was a judicial or ministerial act. Having regard in particular to our post-1937 constitutional jurisprudence, I am absolutely satisfied that at the very least the District Court judge would have had to act judicially and that he would have had to carry out the function sitting in court. Once he has to sit in court it must be a court within the appropriate district for the reasons given by Fennelly J. If it was not for some authority going the other way I must confess that I would have thought that the issue of the warrant should be regarded as a judicial act. However, I do not think that anything turns on this. I am satisfied that a judge would have to act judicially and sit in his proper district.

8. I would reiterate again that I take the view that the manner in which the District Court is to exercise its jurisdiction can be found only in the 1924 Act and subsequent Acts as applied by the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 as amended. In my view, the 1923 Act is irrelevant except of course in so far as jurisdictions under it were carried over by the 1924 Act. Fennelly J. in his judgment has observed that it is curious that section 2(2) of the 1923 Act was not repealed. I think that the simple answer to that is to be found in the bound index to Statutes 1922-1982 where in respect of the District Justices (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 in the column where one would expect to see repeals or amendments there is simply the word “spent”. I do not think that that is an inaccurate description by the compiler of the index. Once the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 was passed the 1923 Act simply became spent.

9. I am in agreement with Fennelly J. as to the orders to be made on the appeal and the cross-appeal and there is nothing more which I want to add.